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THE RISK OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY:
LITIGATORS RECEIVING ANONYMOUSLY
DISCLOSED DOCUMENTS AND THE
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
Rebecca J. Spendley*
The American Bar Association (ABA) created the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to provide guidance to lawyers, courts, and the entire
legal profession regarding what a lawyer’s ethical duties entail. Model Rule
4.4(b) requires a lawyer to notify opposing counsel once the receiving lawyer
knows, or reasonably should know, that the documents received were
inadvertently sent. The ABA, however, explicitly left documents disclosed
intentionally and without authorization beyond the scope of the rules, thus
leaving lawyers who receive these documents with little guidance. Courts
have taken varying approaches to handling documents of this type: some
analogize unauthorized disclosures to inadvertent disclosures and mandate
notice for documents provided by anonymous third parties, while others
instead refuse to impose a notification requirement.
This Note discusses the conflict about the notification requirement and
anonymously disclosed documents. It examines the arguments for and
against mandating notice to the opposing party in these situations. This Note
proposes that notice should be required for intentional disclosures made by
anonymous third parties because these documents can be analogized to those
addressed in Model Rule 4.4(b), which implements a notice requirement for
inadvertent disclosures. This Note then discusses how the ABA is in the best
position to resolve the inconsistencies discussed and proposes a revised
Model Rule 4.4(b) to help alleviate the uncertainty in this realm.
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INTRODUCTION
Just as the primary methods of communication have evolved and changed
with the times, so too have the legal ethics rules governing communications.
Alongside this evolution comes new dilemmas for lawyers trying to
determine what their ethical duties entail.1 The American Bar Association
(ABA) originally adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the
“Model Rules”) in 1983 and has continued to revise them since, in part to
help law firms keep up to date with the internet and other technology.2 While
the Model Rules address some of the ethical quandaries a lawyer may face,3
there remain many situations in which lawyers might find themselves without
clear guidance as to what their ethical obligations are.4
A lawyer has an obligation to “zealously . . . protect and pursue a client’s
legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law,”5 but there must be limits
to that obligation.6 For example, perhaps a lawyer receives an email, with
no indication as to the sender’s identity,7 containing documents which are
extremely helpful to one of the lawyer’s ongoing cases. The lawyer cannot
ascertain any information about the source of the documents but knows they
are valuable documents that are clearly confidential and perhaps protected by
attorney-client privilege.8 This Note explores situations such as this
1. See generally Bruce Green, Handle with Care, 42 AM. BAR ASS’N LITIG. J. 9 (2016).
2. Ronald D. Rotunda, Applying the Revised ABA Model Rules in the Age of the Internet:
The Problem of Metadata, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 176 (2013).
3. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
4. See infra Parts I.A–B, II.
5. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl.
6. See infra notes 229–33 and accompanying text.
7. This could occur because the documents are sent from a fake email address, for
example, which can mask the sender’s identity.
8. Determining whether the documents are confidential or privileged is often irrelevant
to the court’s determination of the lawyer’s ethical duties. See infra Parts I.C.2.c, II.
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hypothetical and examines whether a lawyer who receives9 anonymously
provided documents10 should be required to notify opposing counsel to avoid
court-imposed sanctions.11
Unauthorized disclosures occur when a third party deliberately sends
information to a lawyer that the lawyer is not authorized to have.12 While
there are many facets of unauthorized disclosures,13 this Note only discusses
solutions in the context of anonymously disclosed documents. In a time
when hacking and cybersecurity breaches are increasingly frequent,
anonymous disclosures leave many lingering questions,14 and this Note seeks
to resolve some of these uncertainties.
Although the ABA has contemplated bringing unauthorized disclosures
within the scope of the Model Rules, it ultimately decided that these
documents were best left to the discretion of the courts. Only inadvertent
disclosures, therefore, are included in Model Rule 4.4(b).15 The ABA’s
explicit omission has led to inconsistent decisions from courts tasked with
handling unauthorized disclosures, which in turn has sown confusion among
lawyers finding themselves in these situations.16 This Note argues that
anonymous disclosures—which are presumed to be given without
authorization from the owner of the documents because the documents are
detrimental to the opposition’s case—should be subject to a mandatory notice
requirement. This Note subsequently contends that because the ABA is in
the best position to provide such guidance, the ABA should revise Model
9. This Note does not discuss situations in which the lawyer personally plays a role in
obtaining the documents because this is generally seen as unethical. See supra Part I.E.1. It
instead focuses specifically on instances in which an anonymous third party provides the
documents.
10. This Note focuses on litigators’ ethical obligations. Transactional lawyers, who
generally practice outside the courtroom, are not formal discovery process participants and
thus have different obligations. But see generally Paula Schaefer, Transactional Lawyers and
Inadvertent Disclosure, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 107 (2011) (arguing that
transactional lawyers also need inadvertent disclosure protections). Litigators face unique
problems in this realm because there is a risk of inadvertent disclosure during discovery and
because the presiding judge could decide, among other things, to waive attorney-client
privilege or to sanction the lawyer for improper conduct pertaining to improperly discovered
documents. See generally Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017
WL 2831485 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392
(N.D. Ill. 2010). This Note, when discussing notice obligations, generally refers to the
obligation to provide notice to opposing counsel, which is the notification requirement
imposed in Model Rule 4.4(b). See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b).
11. This Note discusses court-imposed sanctions only; therefore, discipline imposed by
state bar associations is beyond its scope.
12. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 94-382 (1994).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Ransomware Attacks Grow, Crippling Cities and
Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/09/technology/
ransomware-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/2LZH-K6SN]; David E. Sanger & Nicole
Perlroth, More Hacking Attacks Found as Officials Warn of ‘Grave Risk’ to U.S. Government,
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/17/us/politics/russia-cyberhack-trump.html [https://perma.cc/7TYU-F8T5].
15. See infra notes 33–45 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II.
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Rule 4.4(b) to explicitly bring anonymous disclosures within the purview of
the Model Rules.17
Part I provides relevant background information regarding the ABA’s
history of dealing with inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures and details
other potentially relevant law. Part II examines opposing viewpoints
regarding whether notice should be mandatory for documents disclosed by
an anonymous third party. Part III proposes a revised ABA Model Rule that
would be the most efficient solution to the problem of notice and
anonymously disclosed documents.
I. INADVERTENT DISCLOSURES AND UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES
The receipt of unauthorized documents18 continues to present a gray area
in lawyering ethics.19 To start, this part discusses the background of
inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures. Part I.A explains the distinction
between inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures. Part I.B provides a brief
overview of how the ABA has previously addressed unauthorized
disclosures. Part I.C examines other laws that can be helpful when
determining a lawyer’s obligations since unauthorized disclosures fall
beyond the scope of the ethical rules. Part I.D highlights the conflicting
interests contemplated when lawyers question their ethical duties. Lastly,
Part I.E discusses how the method of obtaining the documents may impact
the notice obligation.
A. Defining Unauthorized and Inadvertent Disclosures
The key difference between inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures is
that an unauthorized disclosure results from the provider’s deliberate, not
mistaken, disclosure. Inadvertent disclosures generally refer to instances
where the sender of the information in question did not intend to make the
disclosure.20 Conversely, a lawyer may also receive materials from a source
who deliberately sends them to the lawyer without permission from the
document’s owner—an unauthorized disclosure.21 This situation is often
seen in wrongful termination and qui tam22 proceedings where the client or
third party (often an employee or former employee of the opposing party or
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. In this Note, “documents” refers to electronic or physical copies of information. This
Note does not cover verbally disseminated information.
19. See generally Mitchell James Kendrick, Comment, A Shot in the Dark: The Need to
Clearly Define a Lawyer’s Obligations Upon the Intentional Receipt of Documents from an
Anonymous Third Party, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 753 (2019). See also infra notes 33–45 and
accompanying text.
20. See James M. Fischer, Ethically Handling the Receipt of Possibly Privileged
Information, 1 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 200, 206 (2011).
21. Id. at 221. When discussing unauthorized disclosures, there could be implications of
breaches of contract, fiduciary duties, or similar claims. However, this Note focuses solely on
the lawyer’s duties and whether the lawyer breached an ethical duty.
22. Qui tam proceedings are statutory claims that allow a private person to sue for a
penalty, part of which the government or some public institution will receive. See Qui Tam
Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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a whistleblower) delivers information believed to be useful to the party
opposing the party’s former employer.23 Unauthorized disclosures occur
when the person who obtains or sends the documents does so without
permission from the original owner of the documents.24 These are two
distinct types of disclosures; however, treatment of them is intertwined.
B. The ABA’s History with Inadvertent and Unauthorized Disclosures
The ABA has previously addressed inadvertent and unauthorized
disclosures but ultimately decided to withdraw the formal opinion that
discussed unauthorized disclosures, thus leaving other relevant law to govern
them.25 Part I.B.1 introduces the ABA Model Rules. Part I.B.2 discusses
the relevant ABA formal opinions.
1. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Rule 4.4(b)
The ABA’s Model Rules provide a basis for ethical guidelines for
lawyers.26 Although each state has its own version of ethics rules, many
states’ rules are based on the Model Rules.27 Approximately two-thirds of
the states, along with the District of Columbia, have adopted the Model
Rules, while several other states have developed hybrid rules based off the
Model Rules’ predecessor, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
or have created their own unique versions of legal ethics rules by making
amendments to any of these sources.28 The Model Rules themselves are not
inherently binding and only take on the force of law to the extent that they
influence what version(s) the states adopt as their own legal ethics rules.29
There are a few rules a lawyer may consider when dealing with
anonymously disclosed documents. First, Model Rule 4.2 prohibits
communication about the subject matter of the representation between a
lawyer and a person the lawyer knows to be represented unless the lawyer
has the consent of that individual’s lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.30
Model Rule 8.4, a more general provision, prohibits a lawyer from engaging
in criminal or dishonest conduct.31 Model Rule 8.4(d) prohibits lawyers from
engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”32

23. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 221.
24. See id. at 221–22.
25. See id. at 229–30.
26. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
27. See, e.g., Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Indiana
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as its Rules of Professional Conduct in
1987.”).
28. Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s Former
Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege Doctrines, and
Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868, 884–85 (2003).
29. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168–69 (1986) (discussing how once Iowa
adopted the ethics rule, it became binding on all lawyers who appear in courts in Iowa).
30. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.2.
31. Id. r. 8.4.
32. Id. r. 8.4(d).

2021]

THE RISK OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY

1403

Most important to this Note, Model Rule 4.4(b) states that “[a] lawyer who
receives a document or electronically stored information . . . and knows or
reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored
information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”33
Adopted in 2002, Rule 4.4(b) was written as a compromise. By only
requiring notification and nothing further (such as returning the document),
the rule permits the sending lawyer to “take whatever steps might be
necessary or available to protect the interests of the sending lawyer’s
client.”34 Model Rule 4.4(b), however, is silent regarding the ethical
implications of documents that are sent intentionally rather than
inadvertently.35 A comment36 to Model Rule 4.4 further elaborates that this
rule does not involve receipt of stolen documents but rather merely addresses
the issue of lawyers receiving something by mistake.37 Model Rule 4.4(b)
states the lawyer must know (actually or constructively) that the information
was inadvertently sent38 but provides no guidance as to how the lawyer
would determine this.39 Model Rule 4.4(b) only addresses the notice
obligation—leaving any further steps needed to be taken by the lawyer to
considerations of privilege and waiver—and thus leaves the resolution of the
issue to the application of case law and other relevant law.40
In the annotations41 to Model Rule 4.4, the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the “Committee”) acknowledges the
lack of consistency in the adoption and application of Model Rule 4.4(b).42
The annotations address unauthorized disclosures and acknowledge that
many courts have chosen to expand the scope of Model Rule 4.4(b) beyond
its existing minimum requirement.43 The annotations concede that the rule
“tempers the zeal with which the lawyer is permitted to represent a client”
but confirm that the scope of the rule, as written, does not reach unauthorized

33. Id. r. 4.4(b).
34. CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2005, at 556 (2006).
35. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b).
36. The comments do not add obligations to the Model Rules but rather provide guidance
on how to interpret the Model Rules. Id. pmbl.
37. Id. r. 4.4(b) cmt. 2.
38. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (“‘Knowingly,’ ‘known,’ or ‘knows’
denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances.”); id. r. 1.0(j) (“‘Reasonably should know’ . . . denotes that a lawyer of
reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.”).
39. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 207.
40. See id. at 208; see infra Part I.C.2.
41. The Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct is an ABA publication that
discusses how courts, disciplinary bodies, and ethics committees apply the Model Rules. See
Annotated
Model
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/products/inv/book/364918796/ [https://perma.cc/4T73-V9GD]
(last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
42. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
43. Id.
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disclosures.44 The Model Rules, therefore, result in significant ambiguity for
lawyers dealing with intentionally produced documents.45
2. The ABA’s Formal Opinions
In addition to the Model Rules themselves, the ABA has published
numerous formal opinions that shed light on the history of the ABA’s
treatment of unauthorized and inadvertent disclosures. These opinions are
not binding but are merely advisory and explain how the ABA would
interpret certain provisions or situations.46 The ABA first addressed the issue
of inadvertent disclosures in Formal Opinion 92-368, which placed ethical
obligations squarely on the receiving lawyer and required the receiving
lawyer to refrain from examining the materials, notify the sending lawyer,
and abide by the sending lawyer’s instructions.47
However, no
corresponding model rule supported this position.48
Next, before adopting Model Rule 4.4(b), the Committee issued Formal
Opinion 94-382 and placed obligations on lawyers who received unsolicited
confidential or privileged documents that were intentionally disclosed
without authorization.49 The Committee recognized that inadvertent
disclosures and unauthorized disclosures were similar because, in both
situations, the disclosure was nonconsensual from the adverse party’s
perspective.50 However, the Committee noted two dissimilarities: (1) with
inadvertent disclosures, the transmitting party does not intend to send the
materials and (2) unauthorized disclosures may involve situations evidencing
improper conduct.51 Notwithstanding these differences, the Committee
concluded that the lawyer’s obligations should be the same for both
inadvertent disclosures and unauthorized disclosures.52
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Op.
2019-3 (2019) (discussing how Rule 4.4(b) does not address further obligations of the
receiving lawyer and noting that “[s]ubstantive law, procedural rules, judicial decisions, court
orders, and/or agreements between the parties typically will impose additional obligations or
restrictions”).
46. See In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 349 n.1, 350, 354 (Tex. 1998) (discussing how the
formal opinion on which the court of appeals relied is merely advisory and does not impose a
binding standard); see also Publications: Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
[https://perma.cc/6WKD-DVP3] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021) (“ABA Formal Ethics Opinions
are interpretations of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . [They] are not binding
authority in any jurisdiction without adoption in such a jurisdiction. They are persuasive
authority and express policy of the American Bar Association.”).
47. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
48. See Tory L. Lucas, Rethinking Lawyer Ethics to Allow the Rules of Evidence, Rules of
Civil Procedure, and Private Agreements to Control Ethical Obligations Involving
Inadvertent Disclosures, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235, 242 (2019) (criticizing Formal Opinion
92-368 and noting that the Committee did not define and apply an ethics rule but rather placed
significant weight on the preamble).
49. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 94-382 (1994).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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However, after the ABA adopted Model Rule 4.4(b) in 2002, it withdrew
Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety because the Model Rules no longer
supported it.53 In its place, the Committee released Formal Opinion 06-440,
which makes clear that Model Rule 4.4(b) does not apply to intentionally sent
documents disclosed without authorization and that the lawyer’s action in
those situations is beyond the scope of the Model Rules.54 Lastly, the
Committee confirmed in Formal Opinion 11-460 that the lawyer has no duty
to notify the opposing party under the Model Rules when dealing with
intentionally sent documents that are disclosed without authorization.55 In
this formal opinion, however, the Committee did advise lawyers to proceed
with caution and not risk a potential ethical violation when dealing with
confidential and privileged documents.56
The ABA has continued to go back and forth in deciding how best to deal
with intentional disclosures of documents.57 Currently, even when the Model
Rules are viewed together with the formal opinions, there is still a void in
guidance for lawyers dealing with unauthorized disclosures.58
C. Unauthorized Disclosures Are Beyond the Scope of the Model Rules
Because the ABA explicitly situates unauthorized disclosures beyond the
scope of the Model Rules,59 lawyers must turn to other law and courts’
jurisprudence when navigating this issue. Part I.C.1 discusses courts’ role as
the ultimate authority in determining a lawyer’s ethical duties. Part I.C.2
briefly examines how unauthorized disclosures may be governed by the laws
concerning privilege.
1. Courts’ Role in Lawyering Ethics
Because ethics rules generally fail to prescribe the appropriate action for
recipients of unauthorized disclosures, it is often left to the discretion of the

53. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) (withdrawing Formal
Opinion 94-382 in its entirety). Formal Opinion 94-382 remains relevant because some courts
have continued to rely on it despite the ABA’s withdrawal. See Kendrick, supra note 19, at
762–63 (discussing how some courts, in determining the proper course of conduct dealing
with intentionally disclosed documents, relied on withdrawn ABA formal opinions); see, e.g.,
Burt Hill v. Hassan, No. Civ.A. 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010)
(referencing Formal Opinion 94-382).
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) (“[T]here is no Model
Rule that addresses the duty of a recipient of [intentionally] transmitted information.”). This
opinion also addresses the fact that there might be other law or other obligations beyond Model
Rule 4.4(b). Id.
55. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
56. Id.
57. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence K. Hellman, When
“Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean What They Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics
Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 334 (1996) (noting that the ABA formal ethics
opinions often set forth the ABA Ethics Committee’s “view of what the rules should say or
were meant to say” rather than reflect a straightforward rule that leaves little to interpret).
58. See infra Part II. See generally Kendrick, supra note 19.
59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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courts to step in and decipher the complicated set of applicable laws.60 The
Model Rules make clear that “[t]he legal profession is largely
self-governing.”61 Because of this self-governing nature, the ultimate
authority is found in the court system.62 Courts may look beyond the ethics
rules, given a court’s “responsibility to preserve a reasonable balance
between the need to ensure ethical conduct on the part of lawyers appearing
before it and other social interests.”63 Courts thus have the discretion to
decide if attorneys have violated their moral and ethical responsibilities and,
if so, to fashion appropriate remedies; this leads to many inconsistencies
among jurisdictions.64
2. Attorney-Client Privilege and Privilege Waiver
Courts may also draw on relevant law beyond the ethics rules to determine
a lawyer’s obligations.65 Many of the documents in question, such as those
disclosed by a former employee in the examples discussed above, may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege covering the communications
between the former employer and the employer’s counsel.66 The
attorney-client privilege is the result of an evidentiary rule that, at a high
level, allows both a lawyer or a client to refuse to disclose certain
communications67 between the attorney and the client.68 This protection
encourages the client to disclose everything that is pertinent to the attorney’s
representation without fear that the communication will be used to the
client’s detriment, which in turn allows the attorney to represent the client to
the best of the attorney’s ability.69
60. See generally Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392 (N.D.
Ill. 2010); Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
61. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
62. Id. (stating that “ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the
courts”).
63. Woods v. Covington Cnty. Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976).
64. See Richardson v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385–86 (3d Cir. 1972) (“It
is the duty of the district court to examine the charge, since it is that court which is authorized
to supervise the conduct of the members of its bar.”); see also Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d
241, 245 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[T]he District Court has a valid interest in regulating the
qualifications and conduct of counsel . . . .”).
65. See supra notes 45, 63 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *2 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (noting that some of the anonymously delivered
documents were stamped “privileged”).
67. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68–86 (AM. L. INST. 2000). The work product doctrine also protects
attorney work product from discovery. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)
(establishing the work product doctrine); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 87(3).
68. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating the general rule of privileges); see also Jenna C.
Newmark, Note, The Lawyer’s “Prisoner’s Dilemma”: Duty and Self-Defense in
Postconviction Ineffectiveness Claims, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 711–12 (2010).
69. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (discussing how the
purpose of privilege is to “encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients”); see also Newmark, supra note 68, at 712.
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This section discusses the various intricacies of privilege laws, which are
critical because many unauthorized disclosures are likely to be privileged
and/or confidential. Part I.C.2.a discusses the differing views on when
privilege may be waived. Part I.C.2.b explains Federal Rule of Evidence 502
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B). Lastly, Part I.C.2.c
highlights the differences between confidentiality and privilege and explains
how the courts tend to handle these distinctions.
a. Varying Views on Privilege Waiver
Model Rule 4.4(b) notes that the issue of privilege waiver is beyond the
scope of the Model Rules.70 This topic continues to stir debates because of
the differences in how courts handle it.71 The traditional view states that the
failure to protect privileged information from unauthorized disclosure72
destroys documents’ privileged status, placing a strict obligation on the
owner of the documents.73 The modern view, contrarily, is that the
unauthorized disclosure of privileged information does not automatically
destroy the protected status of the information.74
It is important, however, to distinguish the ethical issues from the privilege
waiver issues. The law of waiver does not resolve every issue that emerges.75
For example, return to the hypothetical of the lawyer who receives valuable
documents from an anonymous third party.76 In the relevant hypothetical
jurisdiction, an unauthorized disclosure automatically waives the
attorney-client privilege.77 Many may then assume that, because the
privilege has been waived, a lawyer’s ethical obligations become irrelevant
and the lawyer has the right—maybe even the obligation—to use the
document as the lawyer sees fit to zealously serve the client’s interests.78
However, simply because there is “a legal right to use a document does not
mean that the ethics rules should allow the lawyer to take advantage of that
70. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) cmt. 2.
71. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 223–28.
72. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(c) (“A lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to,
information relating to the representation of a client.”).
73. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 223; see also People v. Rittenhouse, 206 P. 86, 88 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1922) (stating that an incriminating note intended for the defendant’s attorney
from the defendant in his jail cell was privileged, but stating the privilege was waived because
the defendant did not protect the note from discovery by third parties); David B. Smallman,
The Purloined Communications Exception to Inadvertent Waiver: Internet Publication and
Preservation of Attorney-Client Privilege, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 724–28 (1997) (discussing
cases addressing the issue of waiver of privilege when confidential information is
misappropriated).
74. Fischer, supra note 20, at 223–24.
75. See Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules:
The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767, 778 (2005).
76. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
77. See Smallman, supra note 73, at 723.
78. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (“A lawyer
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”); see also Perlman, supra note 75, at 778.
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right.”79 Therefore, as some commentators argue, the issue of privilege
waiver does not end the inquiry into whether or not a lawyer’s actions are
ethical regarding privileged documents.80
b. Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B)
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 502 addresses disclosure of a
communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege.81
FRE 502(b) states in pertinent part that disclosure does not result in a waiver
of privilege if the disclosure was inadvertent, the privilege holder took
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure, and the privilege holder took
reasonable steps to rectify the error (including possibly following Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 26(b)(5)(B)).82 This is a fact-specific
inquiry assessed on a case-by-case basis.83
Next, FRCP 26(b)(5) establishes that any claims of privilege must be
documented in sufficient detail such that other parties can ascertain whether
the privilege applies.84 FRCP 26(b)(5)(B), also known as the clawback rule,
imposes no duty on the lawyer who receives inadvertently sent privileged
information unless and until the lawyer is notified that the information was
inadvertently sent.85 If the receiving lawyer is notified, the lawyer must
return, sequester, or destroy the document and any copies. The receiving
lawyer must also take reasonable steps to retrieve any information that was
already disclosed and may not use or disclose the information until the claim
is resolved.86
FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) applies during the discovery phase of a civil lawsuit in
federal court.87 Therefore, if a lawyer receives inadvertently disclosed and
protected documents during the discovery phase of a federal lawsuit, the
lawyer must consider the state’s version of Model Rule 4.4(b), FRCP
26(b)(5)(B), and FRE 502 together.88 On the one hand, unlike Model Rule
4.4(b), FRCP 26 does not impose any obligations on the receiving party to

79. Perlman, supra note 75, at 778.
80. Id. at 780 (“[W]aiver law does not determine the obligations of lawyers who have
received inadvertently disclosed, privileged information from an adversary.”). The issue falls
more directly within the province of professional ethics and explains why the courts tend to
treat this as an ethics issue. Id.
81. FED. R. EVID. 502. FRE 502 also concerns communication or information protected
by the work product doctrine. Id.
82. FED. R. EVID. 502(b); see also Ann M. Murphy, Is it Safe?: The Need for State Ethical
Rules to Keep Pace with Technological Advances, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1651, 1652 (2012).
83. See John M. Barkett, Evidence Rule 502: The Solution to the Privilege-Protection
Puzzle in the Digital Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1589, 1595–96 (2013).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
85. Id. 26(b)(5)(B).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 502; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2021).
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notify the producing party.89 On the other hand, FRCP 26 imposes greater
obligations on the receiving lawyer, once notified, to sequester and refrain
from using the allegedly privileged document; Model Rule 4.4(b) does not
impose such obligations.90 Lastly, FRE 502(b) determines whether a waiver
of privilege has occurred.91 These rules, however, do not address the issue
of intentional, anonymous disclosures, leaving lawyers who receive such
documents with little guidance.92
c. Confidential Versus Privileged Documents
To cause even more confusion, confidentiality and privilege are sometimes
conflated in the legal world.93 There are numerous cases in which courts
even conflate the two principles.94 Confidentiality was developed as a matter
of professional etiquette, and it is concerned with how lawyers’ relationships
with their clients should evolve to best serve the legal system.95 Therefore,
confidentiality rules are extremely broad and cover essentially all
information that relates to a client’s case, with extremely narrow
exceptions.96 Many confidential documents, in contrast to privileged
documents, are subject to discovery or production in court.97
On the other hand, courts and legislators are the creators of the
attorney-client privilege rules.98 Judges tend to interpret attorney-client
privilege narrowly to cover only certain types of communications, with many
exceptions.99 Due to the narrow construction of attorney-client privilege and
89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b).
90. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B);
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b).
91. FED. R. EVID. 502; see also Barkett, supra note 83, at 1598.
92. See supra Parts I.C.1–2.
93. See Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV.
69, 71–72 (1999).
94. See, e.g., Vela v. Superior Ct., 255 Cal. Rptr. 921, 924 (Ct. App. 1989) (equating
confidentiality and privilege for purposes of judicial review); State v. Phelps, 545 P.2d 901,
903–05 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (confusing privilege and confidentiality).
95. Zacharias, supra note 93, at 72–73.
96. See id. at 73 (“[P]rofessional confidentiality rules developed extremely broadly, in all
jurisdictions.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021)
(defining confidential information as all “information relating to representation of a client”).
The permitted exceptions to confidentiality include revealing information necessary to
“prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,” to “secure legal advice about
the lawyer’s compliance” with the Model Rules, or to “prevent the client from committing a
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s
services.” Id. r. 1.6(b).
97. Zacharias, supra note 93, at 75.
98. Id. at 73–74.
99. See, e.g., United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984) (construing
privilege narrowly); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546,
547 (D.D.C. 1970) (holding that “[the privilege] has such an effect on the full disclosure of
the truth that it must be narrowly construed”); see also Weil v. Inv./Indicators Rsch. & Mgmt.,
Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting the obstacles that the attorney-client privilege
imposes on the discovery of truth); Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir.
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the fact-sensitive nature of a privilege inquiry, it is often difficult for
attorneys to predict whether a received document is privileged.100
Therefore, courts, clients, and lawyers are often confused about the
differences between confidential and privileged documents.101 As a result,
some courts have declined to distinguish between the two types of documents
and have avoided the issue of privilege waiver altogether.102 Consequently,
it can be difficult for a lawyer, especially when dealing with documents that
are anonymously delivered, to determine whether a document is privileged
or confidential just by looking at it.103 For this reason, anonymously
disclosed documents should be treated the same, regardless of if they are
privileged or confidential, due to the lack of knowledge on the part of the
receiving lawyer at the time of receipt.
D. Conflicting Interests of a Lawyer’s Duty
When grappling with the answers to difficult ethical questions, there are a
multitude of interests at play.104 First, there is the lawyer’s responsibility to
act in the client’s best interests.105 This notion has been instilled in lawyers
since their first day of law school. However, the lawyer is also obligated to
uphold justice, fairness, and equality and serve the public good.106 Lastly,
there is the personal interest of lawyers, who want to best serve their career
and their conscience by remaining ethical and serving their clients to the best
of their ability.107 The concern arises when these interests are at odds with
one another and when a lawyer receives a questionable document: which
interest should prevail?108
1977) (arguing that because privilege hinders the discovery of truth, it may be strictly
construed).
100. See In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 601 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing how a district court’s
holding that the attorney-client privilege does not protect communications is a determination
of fact); Adam Pierson, What’s Yours Is Ours: Making Sense of Inadvertent Disclosure, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1095, 1099–100 (2009).
101. See Zacharias, supra note 93, at 71–72; see also Pierson, supra note 100, at 1099.
102. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *16 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (“[T]here appears to be no reason to distinguish
between those documents marked privileged and those which are merely marked confidential
or proprietary.”).
103. See Pierson, supra note 100, at 1099–100. See generally Kendrick, supra note 19.
104. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
105. Id. (“As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the
client’s legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system. As
negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements
of honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client’s legal
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.”).
106. Id. (“[A]ll lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic
influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic
or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal
profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public
interest.”).
107. Id. (discussing the “lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning
a satisfactory living”).
108. See infra Parts II, III.A.
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E. The Method of Obtaining Documents
Ascertaining how documents are obtained is the first step in determining a
lawyer’s obligations. For inadvertent disclosures, if the receiving lawyer
obtained the documents seemingly by mistake, Model Rule 4.4(b) requires
that the receiving lawyer notify the sending lawyer.109 However, there are
many questionable methods of obtaining documents. This section briefly
discusses the different methods of obtaining information and how these
methods indicate whether the lawyer has violated an ethical rule or has a
further ethical obligation beyond using the document in the client’s best
interest. This section focuses on two methods of obtaining documents, which
are generally impermissible and thus beyond the scope of this Note’s
proposal. Part I.E.1 highlights the obligations applicable to a lawyer
soliciting documents, while Part I.E.2 discusses the obligations involving
illegally obtained documents.
1. Solicited Documents
Solicitation is defined as “[t]he act or an instance of requesting or seeking
to obtain something.”110 First, Model Rule 4.4(a) states that, when
representing a client, a lawyer shall not “use methods of obtaining evidence
that violate the legal rights of [a third party].”111 The “legal rights” protected
under Rule 4.4(a) include a third party’s right to protect confidential and
privileged information.112 In these situations, to avoid possible disciplinary
action, the attorney must make clear to the third party: (1) who the attorney
is representing and (2) that the third party should not disclose any privileged
information.113
For example, return to the previously discussed hypothetical involving
documents disclosed by an opposing party’s former employee.114 However,
now imagine that the lawyer is actually aware that the anonymous party
sending the information is a former employee. If the lawyer contacts the
former employee, the lawyer would need to state who the lawyer is
representing and should endeavor to ensure that additional protected
information is not revealed.115 When evaluating the attorney’s conduct and
determining whether sanctions are appropriate, the court’s inquiry focuses on
109. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b).
110. Solicitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
111. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(a).
112. See Arnold v. Cargill Inc., No. 01-2086, 2004 WL 2203410, at *7 (D. Minn. Sept. 24,
2004) (finding that, because the lawyer knew that the individual he was speaking to had
extensive exposure to confidential and privileged information and yet the lawyer made no
effort to protect those confidences, the lawyer violated Rule 4.4); see also Olson v. Snap Prod.,
Inc., 183 F.R.D. 539, 545 (D. Minn. 1998); Dubois v. Gradco Sys., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 341, 347
(D. Conn. 1991).
113. See Gifford v. Target Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (D. Minn. 2010) (discussing
how the lawyers properly cautioned the individual not to divulge attorney-client information);
Dubois, 136 F.R.D. at 347 (requiring the lawyers to “make clear . . . the nature of the lawyer’s
role in this case”).
114. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
115. See Gifford, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
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the likelihood that the information gathered by the attorney was protected by
privilege.116 To deter unethical and extralegal discovery by parties, when a
lawyer plays an active role (such as soliciting the documents instead of
passively receiving them), the court can prohibit the use of the tainted
material.117 This serves to encourage lawyers to obtain the documents
through ethical processes.118 Therefore, soliciting privileged or confidential
documents is beyond the scope of this Note because these actions are
generally considered unethical and prohibited rather than merely
questionable.119
2. Illegally Obtained Documents
Courts generally state that a lawyer who knowingly uses illegally obtained
materials (e.g., evidence that the lawyer knows is stolen) clearly violates
ethics rules.120 Courts in most jurisdictions are consistent in their rulings that
lawyers may not use documents taken illegally or improperly (as
distinguished from those inadvertently received).121
There are many situations that do not involve solicited or illegally obtained
documents, however. While multiple courts have held that a lawyer cannot
personally obtain documents illegally,122 there could be questionable
situations if a document was obtained by an outside third party and the lawyer
lacks knowledge of the circumstances surrounding how the document was
obtained.123 Those questionable situations are exactly what this Note
discusses in Part II.

116. See, e.g., Jose Luis Pelaez, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings LLC, 366
F. Supp. 3d 567, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that ex parte conversation was acceptable “so
long as measures are taken to steer clear of privileged or confidential information”); Olson,
183 F.R.D. at 545 (finding no grounds for disqualification when the attorney was in contact
with the adverse party’s CEO because the attorney alerted the CEO who he represented and
did not ask the CEO to discuss privileged matters).
117. See Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Perna v.
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 916 F. Supp. 388, 396–98 (D.N.J. 1995); Smith v. Armour Pharm. Co.,
838 F. Supp. 1573, 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
118. See, e.g., Madanes 186 F.R.D. at 292. Additionally, if a court were to find an ethics
violation by a lawyer who passively received documents from a questionable source, there
would be no deterrent value because the punishment would not fall on the wrongdoer, who
may not even be involved in the litigation. See Perna, 916 F. Supp. at 400–01 (stating that an
effective sanction must deter the individual, as well as others, from engaging in that behavior
again).
119. See, e.g., Madanes, 186 F.R.D. at 292; Olson, 183 F.R.D. at 545; Dubois v. Gradco
Sys., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 341, 347 (D. Conn. 1991).
120. JOSEPH T. MCLAUGHLIN & J. KEVIN MCCARTHY, CORPORATE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS—LEGAL PRIVILEGES AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE EMPLOYMENT LAW
CONTEXT 950 (2001).
121. See 69 AM. JUR. TRIALS 411 Ethics in Adversarial Practice § 30 (1998).
122. See, e.g., Castellano v. Winthrop, 27 So. 3d 134, 137 (Fla. App. 2010).
123. See infra Part II.
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II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MANDATING NOTICE FOR
ANONYMOUS DISCLOSURES
Documents disclosed intentionally,124 rather than inadvertently, lie beyond
the scope of the Model Rules.125 This part discusses anonymously delivered
documents that the lawyer takes no active role in obtaining126 and that
themselves are either privileged or protected by a combination of
confidentiality and privilege.127 Courts have taken divergent views in this
narrow realm of case law.128 Part II.A discusses the arguments for mandating
notice for unauthorized disclosures. Part II.B examines the opposite view
and discusses the arguments against mandating notice for unauthorized
disclosures.
A. Lawyers Should Notify Opposing Counsel of Anonymous Disclosures
Various courts, state ethics opinions, ethics rules, and academics have
examined whether inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures are sufficiently
analogous to warrant expansion of the notice requirement derived from
Model Rule 4.4(b) for anonymous disclosures. Part II.A.1 discusses how the
Model Rules and case law emphasize that the rules themselves should not
end a lawyer’s inquiry into ethical obligations. Part II.A.2 discusses the
argument that, because there are no ethics rules on point, unauthorized
disclosures should at least be treated the same as inadvertent disclosures and
notice should thus be mandated. Part II.A.3 briefly discusses the argument
that, in these situations, a court’s interest in maintaining judicial integrity
should outweigh any conflicting interests.
1. The Rules Should Not End the Inquiry into Ethical Duties
The court system has repeatedly endorsed the idea that a lawyer’s ethical
obligations do not end with the black letter law.129 The ethics rules make
clear that the rules themselves should not end a lawyer’s inquiry—that just
because the rules might not specifically address an issue does not allow the
lawyer to conclude that nothing should be done to protect the document

124. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.A.
126. See supra Part I.E.
127. See supra Part I.C.2.c.
128. See infra Part II. While many of the arguments discussed in Part II and emphasized
in Part III can apply generally to all unauthorized disclosures, not just those anonymous
third-party disclosures, this Note is limited in scope by arguing that the notice requirement
should extend to the small facet of case law discussed in Part II.
129. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *10 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); see also Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal
Law of Attorney Ethics, 29 GA. L. REV. 137, 165–66 (1994) (“The prevailing viewpoint,
however, seems to be that attorneys can be disqualified or disciplined even for conduct not
prohibited under any applicable attorney-ethics code. Some federal courts have stated that
applicable codes are not an exhaustive list of ethical considerations, and that attorneys can be
sanctioned for conduct not specifically proscribed by the court’s code.” (footnote omitted)).
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owner’s privilege and confidentiality interests.130 Additionally, the preamble
of the Model Rules notes that the Model Rules do not exhaust a lawyer’s
ethical and moral considerations but simply provide a framework for ethical
lawyering.131 Formal Opinion 06-440 reinforces that same point.132
Unfortunately, as these sources acknowledge, a set of rules is not able to
capture every single circumstance in which ethical questions and conflicts
may arise.133 Commentators note that ethical rules are inherently limited and
that lawyers must seriously consider their actions in situations when there is
no rule clearly on point.134 Any set of ethics rules lacks “definition, depth,
and applicability until and unless [the rules] are read along with the stories
and narratives that illustrate their content, reach, and purpose.”135 Absent a
rule on point, a lawyer should not immediately do what is in the best interest
of the client but rather should consider the broader principles on which the
rules rest.136 Requiring something that is clearly not present in the current
ethical law forces lawyers to rely on their own judgment and ethical decisionmaking to determine the proper conduct.137 As the court in Raymond v. Spirit
AeroSystems Holdings, Inc.138 emphasized, “if something appears too good
to be true, it probably is.”139
The court in Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court of
Nevada ex rel. County of Clark140 acknowledged that Nevada Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4(b)141 as written was not applicable to the
anonymously sourced documents before the court, since the rule explicitly
addressed only inadvertently disclosed documents.142 Nevertheless, the
130. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021); see also Raymond,
2017 WL 2831485, at *10.
131. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl.
132. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).
133. Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the Law of
Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 EMORY
L.J. 1255, 1282 (1999).
134. Id. at 1282–83.
135. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching
of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 175–76 (1996).
136. Jones, supra note 133, at 1295–96.
137. Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485,
at *12 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017).
138. No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017).
139. Id. at *11 (quoting Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433,
at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010)).
140. 262 P.3d 720 (Nev. 2011).
141. The Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) is identical to Model Rule 4.4(b).
NEV. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (2019); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
142. Merits, 262 P.3d at 724. In the state district court opinion, the court noted that
plaintiffs did indeed notify the state district court that the plaintiffs had received these
documents and that defendants took no action to “disavow [p]laintiff of the notion that they
were fair game.” Bumble & Bumble Prods., LLC v. Merits Incentives, LLC, No. A557670-B,
2010 WL 8034115, at *6 (Nev. Dist. Ct. June 11, 2010). The court specifically commented
that there was no discussion of whether the documents give plaintiffs an unfair advantage and
therefore denied the motion for dismissal or disqualification. Id. at *6–7. Additionally, the
court noted that it did not find that defendants acted in bad faith but that, in light of the schedule
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court implemented a notice requirement for the documents and underscored
the importance of lawyers looking beyond the scope of the black letter ethical
rules.143
2. Treat Unauthorized Disclosures the Same as Inadvertent Disclosures
Some courts, therefore, have held that, because there is no ethics rule on
point, analogizing documents disclosed by an anonymous third party to
inadvertent disclosures is valid and, thus, notice should be required for
both.144 One scholar argued even more broadly that all unauthorized
disclosures can be treated the same as inadvertent disclosures.145
This Note, however, focuses on anonymously disclosed documents
because multiple courts examining anonymous disclosures have expressed
concern about the lack of knowledge regarding the source of the
information.146 In both Raymond and Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan,147 the courts
emphasized that the lawyer’s lack of knowledge surrounding the source was
suspicious, criticizing “[d]efense counsel’s failure to provide more specific
information.”148 If treated the same, then both inadvertent and unauthorized
disclosures would require, at a minimum, notifying opposing counsel once
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that someone erred by giving
the lawyer the documents.149
Treating inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures as the same for the
purpose of determining proper conduct would minimize the ambiguity that
riddles many of these situations.150 Several courts have endorsed this
approach—or at least a form of it. In Raymond, with minimal guidance from
other case law, state ethics rules, or the Model Rules, the court decided that
counsel had a duty to, at a minimum, notify the defendants of the received
documents.151 In the case, former Spirit AeroSystems employees who were
for trial, the court would have felt “a lot more comfortable” about the potential for
disqualification if the motion had been brought up earlier. Id. at *8.
143. Merits, 262 P.3d at 724–25. The Merits court noted, however, that the Burt Hill
opinion was not persuasive because, in this case, the lawyer signed an affidavit in which he
declared he had no knowledge of the source of the disk, thus eliminating any sense of
wrongdoing on the part of the lawyer that the Merits court indicates was present in Burt Hill.
Id.
144. See, e.g., Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *22; Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *4.
145. Fischer, supra note 20, at 229–36. Fischer uses “privileged” to include materials
protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, as well as confidential
and proprietary information; in other words, Fischer’s terminology covers all of the types of
information discussed in this Note. Id. at 202 n.1.
146. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *11; Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *4.
147. No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010).
148. Id. at *2; Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *11 (quoting Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433,
at *2).
149. See Fischer, supra note 20, at 234.
150. See id. at 233. Fischer goes on to explain what a lawyer may do upon receipt of
information that is unintentionally disclosed (the phrase he uses to describe both types of
disclosures), such as whether the lawyer may or must return the document, use it, review it,
or clarify the circumstances surrounding it. Id. at 240–48. Other than the notification
requirement, the rest of these issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
151. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *15.
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members of a labor union brought a collective action against Spirit
AeroSystems alleging employment discrimination.152
During the
investigation into the viability of the claims, the director of the labor union
provided the plaintiffs’ lawyer with a packet of documents he claimed were
anonymously delivered to the union’s office.153 The Raymond court noted
that it was “entirely appropriate to analogize” the unauthorized, anonymously
disclosed documents to the inadvertently disclosed documents discussed in
Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b).154 The court explained that the
purpose of the rule was to permit the accidental sender to take proper
protective measures.155 Emphasizing the documents’ “dubious origins,” the
court said that the protections that are applied to inadvertently disclosed
privileged or proprietary information should be at least the same, if not
heightened, when the disclosure is clearly unauthorized. 156
In Burt Hill, one defendant received, from an anonymous source,
privileged and confidential documents delivered in a manila envelope outside
his office space and gave them to his attorneys.157 Defense counsel, unsure
of what their ethical obligations were in these circumstances, sought advice
from a lawyer with expertise in legal ethics and professional
responsibility.158 The expert opined that retaining and reviewing the
documents was permissible.159 The Burt Hill court, however, explained that
the “justifications underlying the protections afforded to inadvertent
products . . . apply with even greater, and stricter, force in connection with
advertent but unauthorized disclosures.”160 Therefore, according to the
Raymond and Burt Hill courts, the lawyers had a duty to notify opposing
152. Id. at *1.
153. Id. at *3–4. Some of these documents were stamped “privileged” and were thus set
aside and not used in the case, but the other documents were retained and used to prepare the
plaintiffs’ complaint without notifying opposing counsel. Id. at *4–5. The court said that
“there appears to be no reason to distinguish between those documents marked privileged and
those which are merely marked confidential or proprietary.” Id. at *16. The Model Rules and
the Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 4.4(b) do not distinguish between the two types
of documents, so the court found it unnecessary to do so. Id.
154. Id. at *14. An exact duplicate of Model Rule 4.4(b), Kansas Rule 4.4(b) reads: “A
lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document
or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”
KAN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (2014).
155. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *14.
156. Id. Plaintiffs objected to the decision by the magistrate judge. See Raymond v. Spirit
AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 3895012, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 6, 2017).
The objections were denied because the district judge found that the magistrate judge properly
relied on case law and the inherent powers of the court to sanction misconduct, which is not
limited by the ethics rules themselves. Id. at *4.
157. Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *1–2 (W.D. Pa.
Jan. 29, 2010).
158. Id. at *5.
159. Id. at *2–3. The expert opined that because the client did nothing to solicit the
materials in question and the materials were provided before the litigation began, the relevant
ethics rules did not apply. Id. at *3. He commented that he “simply cannot find anything that
would prohibit your use of the information in question.” Id.
160. Id. at *4.
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counsel because “documents intentionally and anonymously produced
should create a heightened awareness in both parties and counsel, and the
mysterious nature of the production must also generate an amplified duty of
notification.”161
Chamberlain Group Inc. v. Lear Corp.162 involved an engineer who
previously worked for the defendant company.163 The engineer sent an
unsolicited email to one of the plaintiffs, and the continued communication
ultimately led to the plaintiff’s receipt of unsolicited, privileged documents
that were forwarded to the plaintiff’s counsel.164 The court in Chamberlain
agreed with the Burt Hill court, “fail[ing] to see why” the duty to disclose an
inadvertent receipt under Model Rule 4.4 “should cease where confidential
documents are sent intentionally and without permission.”165
Though it did not deal with anonymously disclosed documents, Stengart
v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.166 provides another example of a court willing
to extend Model Rule 4.4(b) beyond its plain text.167 This case dealt with a
former employee filing an employment discrimination action.168 Her former
employer retained a computer forensic expert to retrieve emails containing
privileged and confidential information that was saved on the hard drive and
later used in the course of discovery.169 Noting that the employer itself did
not hack into the plaintiff’s account or perform any acts of bad faith,170 the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that the employer’s counsel should have
promptly notified opposing counsel when it discovered the nature of the
emails, even if the emails were not inadvertently sent but rather provided
intentionally by a third party.171 New Jersey later codified this result when
it revised Rule 4.4(b) of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct to
explicitly address wrongfully obtained documents and implement a notice
requirement for such documents.172 Tennessee has also codified a similar

161. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *22.
162. 270 F.R.D. 392 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
163. Id. at 393–94.
164. Id. at 394–95. The engineer’s identity was not known at the onset and was only
discovered when the engineer and one of the plaintiffs planned to meet in person. Id. at 395.
165. Id. at 398 (emphasis added) (citing Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *4–5).
166. 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
167. See id. at 666.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 655.
170. See supra Part I.E.
171. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 666.
172. N.J. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (N.J. BAR ASS’N 2015). New Jersey Rule 4.4(b)
adds a separate section, after one that is very similar to Model Rule 4.4(b), that implements a
notify-and-return requirement for lawyers who receive a document that contains privileged
attorney-client communications or who have reasonable cause to believe the document or
information was wrongfully obtained. Id. Harris Davis Rebar, LLC v. Structural Iron Workers
Local Union No. 1, Pension Trust Fund, No. 17-473, 2019 WL 447622 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2019),
draws a similar analogy to Rule 4.4(b) for an intentional disclosure and deals with identified
former employees providing internal documents to the opposing lawyers. Id. at *4–5. The
court noted that it found it “difficult to see why [the sending party’s known or anonymous
identity] would matter” in this specific case. Id.
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rule.173 These rules address an even broader scope of unauthorized
disclosures than the scope of disclosures this Note focuses on.
Although the ABA had two reasons for treating inadvertent disclosures
differently from unauthorized disclosures,174 one scholar argues that these
reasons do not provide a sufficient rationale for distinguishing these types of
disclosures.175 Professor James Fischer says that the distinctions provided
by the ABA are “elusive.”176 Both disclosures occur when someone erred,
and the identity of the person who erred may be relevant to the question of
waiver but does not differentiate between the two types of disclosures.177
Second, the ABA’s speculation of a greater likelihood that unauthorized
disclosure cases deal with information that shows improper or unjust
conduct178 is “asserted, not established” because there was no evidence
provided in the formal opinion other than anecdotal evidence.179 Whether
the documents show evidence of improper conduct could impact the lawyer’s
ability to use the information at trial, but this does not distinguish between
the two types of disclosures at the moment the lawyer receives them.180
Thus, Fischer argues, the best resolution when evaluating the proper conduct
for both forms of disclosures is to use a single approach.181 A single
approach would be fairer when evaluating the consequences because a
lawyer will probably be unsure of how the documents were sent before at
least reviewing the documents in some way.182
In the cases discussed above, the courts emphasized that documents that
are disclosed intentionally by an anonymous third party should be treated at
least the same as those inadvertently disclosed.183 Therefore, Fischer and
these courts argue that the notice requirement found in Model Rule 4.4(b)
should be extended to include intentional disclosures, even if that
requirement is not explicitly written in the rule.
3. Courts’ Interest in Maintaining Integrity Should Outweigh Other
Interests
In addition to analogizing to Model Rule 4.4(b), another argument for
requiring notice is that courts have an interest in maintaining the integrity of
the judicial system by prohibiting unethical, extrajudicial discovery. The
Raymond court posited this by detailing policy arguments and discussing
how “obligations of decency, fundamental fairness, and frankly the golden
rule” should have prompted the lawyers to notify opposing counsel of their
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

TENN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (2018).
See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
Fischer, supra note 20, at 230–32.
Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
Id. at 232.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Fischer, supra note 20, at 232.
Id. at 232–33.
Id. at 233.
Id.
See supra notes 157–82 and accompanying text.
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receipt of the documents.184 In that case, by holding on to these documents
for over two years, plaintiffs’ counsel impermissibly sidestepped the
authorized discovery process.185
When the court in Raymond was determining the proper sanctions for the
lawyers’ handling of the unauthorized receipt of an adverse party’s
information, the court referred to two primary interests: (1) the conduct of
counsel itself and (2) the effects of that conduct, including whether the
conduct was “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”186
Similarly, the Burt Hill court concluded that using its inherent sanctioning
power was warranted and cited numerous cases in which sanctions were
fitting to punish the inappropriate avoidance of the formal discovery
process.187 The court discussed how the defendants and their counsel were
discontent with waiting until the formal discovery process concluded and
therefore chose to inappropriately circumvent it.188 Finally, the Model Rules
themselves acknowledge that lawyers do not need to “press for every
advantage” for their clients but rather should aim to treat “all persons
involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.”189 Therefore, these
sources argue that, to maintain judicial integrity and order in the court
system, lawyers should have a notification requirement for anonymous
disclosures.
B. Lawyers Should Not Have to Notify Opposing Counsel of Anonymous
Disclosures
There are courts, states, and academics, however, that argue that notice
should not be mandated for unauthorized disclosures. This viewpoint leaves
the question of ethical obligations in the event of unauthorized disclosures to
other areas of law, such as the relevant evidence or civil procedure rules. Part
184. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *14.
185. Id. at *15.
186. Id. at *16. Ultimately, the court decided that disqualifying the entire firm of plaintiffs’
counsel would be detrimental to the plaintiffs’ case because it would limit plaintiffs’ access to
counsel and therefore only pursued evidentiary sanctions regarding the use of the
anonymously delivered documents. Id. at *17–19.
187. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 445 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (stating that
“[f]ederal courts have authority to remedy litigation practices that threaten judicial integrity
and the adversary processes” and that “[s]uch inherent authority includes the ability to
‘exclude proprietary documents obtained . . . outside the context of formal discovery’”
(quoting Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., No. 94-CV-0981, 1996 WL 34393321, at
*5–6 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 1996))); Knitting Fever, Inc. v. Coats Holding Ltd.,
No. 05-CV-1065, 2005 WL 3050299, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005) (stating that when
plaintiffs obtained documents from “an undisclosed . . . employee” of defendants, plaintiffs’
counsel had “a clear ethical responsibility to notify [defense] counsel and either follow the
latter’s instructions with respect to the disposition of the documents or refrain from using them
pending ruling by the [c]ourt”); Arnold v. Cargill Inc., No. 01-2086, 2004 WL 2203410, at
*7–10 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2004) (disqualifying plaintiffs’ counsel for using “privileged and/or
confidential” documents obtained from defendant’s former employee).
188. Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Jan.
29, 2010).
189. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
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II.B.1 describes the textualist view, emphasizing that the current ABA Model
Rules and formal opinions explicitly chose to not include intentional
disclosures. Part II.B.2 describes the technocratic view, which argues that
because there is no ethical rule on point, the lawyer should be free to act as
the lawyer best sees fit. Part II.B.3 discusses the argument that this issue is
best left to other law.
1. The ABA Explicitly Leaves Unauthorized Disclosures Out of Its Rules
As discussed, the ABA has clearly stated that all unauthorized disclosures
are outside the scope of the ethics rules.190 Previously, the ABA has utilized
a textualist approach and has limited the scope of Model Rule 4.4(b) to
include only what is explicitly in the text of the rule.191 A previous formal
opinion had addressed unauthorized disclosures, but it was later
withdrawn.192
Some courts have similarly decided that notice is not required given the
absence of an explicit requirement in the ethical rules. In Chesemore v.
Alliance Holdings, Inc.,193 a federal district court in the Western District of
Wisconsin declined to mandate notice for unauthorized disclosures.194 One
plaintiff in this class action lawsuit against an employer instructed other
employees to either send documents directly to counsel or to leave them with
her “anonymously.”195 A current employee took advantage of this
opportunity and “anonymously” gave valuable documents to the plaintiff,
who then provided these documents to counsel.196
The court found no wrongdoing on the lawyer’s part and held that the
anonymous delivery may have suggested an orchestration of plausible
deniability by plaintiffs’ counsel but noted that the situation was “still far
from counsel affirmatively directing employees to reveal confidential
documents.”197 The court held that, as long as the lawyer did not solicit the
confidential information,198 there was no wrongdoing.199 Adhering closely
to the exact wording used in Rule 4.4(b) of Wisconsin’s Rules of Professional

190. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text.
193. 276 F.R.D. 506 (W.D. Wis. 2011). This case is about certifying a proposed class for
the lawsuit. Id. at 509.
194. Id. at 513–14.
195. Id. at 513.
196. Id. at 513–14.
197. Id. at 515–16. However, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
did mention, without elaborating, that there may be policy reasons for sanctioning a lawyer
for not providing notice in this situation but that defendants did not attempt to articulate them
and “the ABA’s revision of its position on the matter weighs against such a view.” Id. at 515.
The Raymond court distinguished the Chesemore opinion partially on this basis—that in
Raymond, the parties clearly articulated policy arguments (which the Raymond court found
persuasive). See Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *12 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017).
198. See supra Part I.E.1.
199. Chesemore, 276 F.R.D. at 514.
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Conduct for Attorneys,200 the Chesemore court highlighted the narrow
situation in which Rule 4.4(b) actually applies and refused to expand the
scope of the rule.201
Additionally, the Chesemore court noted that the Burt Hill case relied on
withdrawn ABA opinions rather than the newest ABA Formal Opinion
06-440,202 which revised the ABA’s position to not include a notice
requirement in these cases.203 The court said that “the ABA’s revision on
this matter weighs against such a view.”204 This approach adhered closely
to the textualist approach that the ABA had previously engaged with respect
to this controversy.205 However, the Raymond court disagreed with the
Chesemore court’s interpretation of ABA Formal Opinion 06-440, because
the Raymond court found that the formal opinion explicitly warns lawyers
that the black letter rules must not end their inquiry into what the proper
conduct is.206
Furthermore, over two-thirds of states have adopted ethics rules that are
almost identical to Model Rule 4.4(b).207 All of these jurisdictions have
opted to follow the lead of the ABA and its version of Model Rule 4.4(b),208
demonstrating that the issue of intentional disclosures must be beyond the
scope of Rule 4.4(b) and, thus, notice should not be mandated.209 In Oregon,
for example, Formal Opinion No. 2011-186 concludes that Rule 4.4(b), by
its express terms, does not require a lawyer to take or refrain from taking any
particular action with respect to documents that were sent purposely.210
200. Wisconsin’s Rule 4.4 implements a notification requirement (along with requiring the
lawyer to stop reading the document) for inadvertently sent documents, much like Model Rule
4.4(b). WIS. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT FOR ATT’YS r. 4.4 (2020); see MODEL RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
201. Chesemore, 276 F.R.D. at 515–16.
202. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
203. Chesemore, 276 F.R.D. at 515.
204. Id.
205. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 11-460 (2011) (stating that “[a]
‘document [is] inadvertently sent’ to someone when it is accidentally transmitted to an
unintended recipient” but that “a document is not ‘inadvertently sent’ when it is retrieved by
a third person from a public or private place where it is stored or left” (quoting M ODEL RULES
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021)); Kendrick, supra note 19, at 760
(discussing how the Committee applied a textualist approach when crafting its formal
opinions); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(b); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro.
Resp., Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) (proffering that if the receipt of “materials is not the result
of the sender’s inadvertence, Rule 4.4(b) does not apply”).
206. Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485, at
*12 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); see supra Part II.A.2; see also supra note 54 and accompanying
text.
207. Becker, supra note 28, at 884–85.
208. See AM. BAR ASS’N, JURISDICTIONAL RULES COMPARISON CHARTS, RULE 4.4:
RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_4_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/62P9B35B].
209. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text.
210. Oregon State Bar, Formal Op. No. 2011-186 (2011). This formal opinion does note,
however, that if the documents contain evidence of a crime, the lawyer may have an obligation
to make the evidence available to the prosecution under Rule 8.4(a)(4). Id. This may not apply
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These states, following the lead of the Model Rules, have chosen to leave
unauthorized disclosures outside of the ethics rules.
2. A Lawyer Is Likely to Act in the Client’s Best Interests
Absent an ethical rule on point, many commentators say that a lawyer is
most likely to have one goal in mind: pursuing whatever course of action is
in the client’s best interests.211 Professor Heidi Feldman calls this
“technocratic” decision-making, emphasizing that a technocrat will utilize
any available weapon to secure the client’s ends or justify an already made
decision.212 As a result of often inconclusive and conflicting ethics rules,
technocratic decision-making has become more prevalent.213 A technocratic
lawyer can develop defensible arguments for almost any position using the
black letter law.214 A technocrat, therefore, will interpret the rules to permit
pursuit of the client’s ends without considering other ethical concerns.215
Professor Feldman further argues that the ethical statutory rules can
actually elicit the technocratic style.216 While Feldman comments that she
values uniformity and predictability, she argues that a good technocrat can
produce valid arguments for interpreting codified legal rules in a wide variety
of ways, resulting in a wide variety of behavior.217 Instead, Feldman argues
for a common-law approach that would tend to narrow the spectrum of
behavior.218 “A robust common law of lawyers’ ethics would provide
constraining information about what sorts of situations create which ethical
responsibilities.”219 She therefore seems to endorse the view that, absent a
rule on point, notice should be discretionary and courts should determine on
a case-by-case basis when notice should be required, creating guidelines for
lawyers in the future with similar factual situations to follow.220
In addition, Professor Monroe Freedman, one of the most widely cited
proponents of zealous advocacy, argues that a lawyer has no duty to protect
the confidentiality between the opposing side and its counsel and that the
lawyer should not be forced to weigh this obligation of confidentiality more
heavily than the lawyer’s own obligation to represent the client zealously.221
His position also illustrates this “strong impulse towards technocratic
if the documents are still entitled to protection under substantive law of privilege or otherwise.
Id.
211. Jones, supra note 133, at 1283–84 (describing the flaws of rule-oriented decision
making).
212. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 886–87 (1996).
213. Id. at 886 n.2.
214. Id. at 897.
215. Id. at 898.
216. Id. at 887.
217. Id. at 934.
218. Id. at 887.
219. Id. at 946–47.
220. See infra notes 243–51 and accompanying text.
221. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (3d ed.
2004).
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decision making.”222 For example, in an article published before the
adoption of Model Rule 4.4(b), Freedman argues that lawyers should have
the right to read and use any supposedly inadvertently sent document to help
their clients’ cases—with no notice required—because the opposing lawyers
did not take care to protect the documents from disclosure.223 This group of
thinkers argues that zealous advocacy furthers autonomy,224 due process
rights,225 and clients’ trust and confidence in their lawyers.226 Freedman
asserts that counsel should take “all reasonable lawful means to attain the
objectives of the client”227 and that any inadequacies in the Model Rules will
“be overcome by tradition and corrected by interpretation.”228
Professors Trina Jones and Andrew Perlman both discuss the possibly
troublesome consequences of Freedman’s view.229 Jones argues that
Freedman’s view encourages lawyers to become dismissive of or to
oversimplify ethical matters not resolved by the Model Rules, by interpreting
the rules as narrowly as possible to promote whatever is in the client’s best
interest.230 Perlman emphasizes the lack of justification for Freedman’s
view, which Perlman says leaves questions as to why zealous advocacy
should be the “nearly exclusive factor” when determining one’s ethical
obligations.231 In a response to Perlman’s article, Freedman emphasized that
Perlman’s statement was wrong: Freedman believes ethics are rooted in the
Bill of Rights and in the autonomy and the dignity of the individual, which
encompasses much more than simply zeal, as Perlman contended.232
Therefore, there is an argument that zealous advocacy should outweigh any
other conflicting interests, and thus lawyers should not have to provide notice
to the opposing party if a rule does not require them to do so.233
3. Anonymous Disclosures Should Be Left to Other Law
Federal courts and scholars following the view that Model Rule 4.4(b)
does not apply to documents that are sent intentionally rely on the FRE,
FRCP, and private agreements to determine what lawyers may or must do
with these documents.234 Depending on what claim is brought in what court,
222. Jones, supra note 133, at 1284.
223. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 221, at 78–79 (criticizing suggestions that the
“advocate’s zeal on behalf of a client should be constricted by moral standards that have not
been enacted into law by the legislature or recognized by the courts”).
224. Id. at 71.
225. Id. at 23.
226. Id. at 130–34.
227. Id. at 84 (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986)).
228. Id.
229. See generally Jones, supra note 133; Perlman, supra note 75.
230. Jones, supra note 133, at 1284.
231. Perlman, supra note 75, at 791.
232. Monroe H. Freedman, Erroneous Disclosure of Damaging Information: A Response
to Professor Andrew Perlman, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 179, 182–83 (2006).
233. See supra notes 211–32 and accompanying text.
234. See supra Part I.C.2; see also Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 506, 515
(W.D. Wis. 2011).
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state laws may also govern. For example, in Merits and Chesemore, each
court decided that the scope of its state’s Rule 4.4 clearly excludes
unauthorized disclosures, and therefore, other law should govern these
situations.235
One commentator, Professor Tory Lucas, argues that inadvertent
disclosure decisions should be aligned with related outside law and that the
rules of ethics should play only a supporting role.236 His solution, while also
advocating for Fischer’s idea of treating both types of disclosures
similarly,237 endorses the view that a receiving lawyer’s ethical obligations
revolving around these disclosures should be left to applicable state or federal
law.238 Leaving this determination to other law would protect every client
with a fair system by ensuring that everyone knows the “rules of the
game.”239 Furthermore, this would align Model Rule 4.4(b) with possible
societal values on these types of disclosures: to serve the interests of the
client, the profession, and the justice system.240 Overall, Lucas’s analysis
advocates for a simple revision of Model Rule 4.4(b)241 and asserts that the
other relevant law does enough to govern this area of ethics.242
Furthermore, this argument contends that the ABA obviously intended for
the inquiry to be a fact-specific one that allows the courts to use their
discretion when determining what is required of lawyers in the event they
receive unauthorized disclosures.243 Intentional disclosures could concern a
wide variety of cases, each with different interests weighing in favor and
against obligations, such as a notice requirement.244 Instead of mandating
notice (or any further ethical obligations, such as the obligation to stop
reading or to return the documents), courts could look to factors and then
conduct a balancing test.245 These factors could include: impropriety of
counsel’s conduct in obtaining the documents;246 the incentives and
235. Chesemore, 276 F.R.D. at 515; Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. of
State, ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 262 P.3d 720, 724–26 (Nev. 2011).
236. Lucas, supra note 48, at 238.
237. Id. at 251 n.74.
238. Id. at 239.
239. Id. at 289.
240. Id.
241. His proposed amendment to Model Rule 4.4(b) is: “The receiving lawyer shall use
inadvertently disclosed documents or information unless prohibited by rules of evidence, rules
of civil procedure, or private agreement.” Id. at 290.
242. Id. Alternatively, the court in Burt Hill emphasized that the two types of documents
should not be treated similarly, even though they found that the notice requirement from Rule
4.4(b) could be used as a starting point for anonymous disclosures that are intentional. See
Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A. 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *4 n.4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29,
2010) (“Although rules and decisions regarding inadvertent disclosures present an appropriate
starting point, the analogy, by definition, eventually loses its vitality.”).
243. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text; see also Perlman, supra note 75, at
809–11 (arguing that notice should be discretionary on the part of the lawyer).
244. See Brado v. Vocera Commc’ns, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
245. See id.
246. See supra Part I.E; see also Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., No. 94-CV-0981,
1996 WL 34393321, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 1996) (identifying the court’s primary concern
as whether the attorneys encouraged or were involved in dishonest conduct); In re Shell Oil

2021]

THE RISK OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY

1425

disincentives of employees to wrongfully take documents;247 the prejudice
to the opposing party;248 the court’s desire to pursue the truth when resolving
a dispute;249 and the public policy motivations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,250
which favors whistleblowers and allows them to remain anonymous. 251
For example, imagine a hypothetical in which a large pharmaceutical
company unlawfully promotes certain products. A whistleblower from
within the company provides information revealing the criminal activity to
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Here, that information from the
whistleblower is valuable for protecting the public’s well-being. This may
be a situation in which the DOJ’s having to provide notice would cause more
harm than good.
In the cases discussed in Part II.A, many of the courts emphasized that
because the documents were obtained without authorization from “dubious”
origins and because of the source’s anonymity, notice should be required.252
A fact-specific inquiry would allow the court to use its own discretion and
weigh these interests, and such an inquiry is obviously what the ABA
intended to occur in these situations.253 In the hypothetical above, a court
could decide that public policy weighs in favor of allowing use of the
documents disclosed. Making notification discretionary would most
effectively allow the court to balance the interests involved.254

Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105, 107–08 (E.D. La. 1992) (disallowing use of documents in litigation
where counsel circumvented the discovery process by obtaining internal documents from a
current Shell employee).
247. See JDS Uniphase Corp. v. Jennings, 473 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702–03 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(finding employee liable for breach of contract for taking documents without authorization
from his employer); Fayemi v. Hambrecht and Quist, Inc., 174 F.R.D. 319, 325–26 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (disallowing use of documents when the plaintiff took the documents).
248. See Brado, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (involving an instance in which the only prejudice
to the opposing party was merely the timing of the access to the documents, since they would
have been produced through discovery anyway); see, e.g., Ashman v. Solectron, Corp.,
No. C-08-1430, 2008 WL 5071101, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2008) (declining to exclude use
of improperly taken documents and only ordering the documents’ return when the documents
likely would have been produced through discovery).
249. See Brado, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1323 (“While the documents may supply greater detail
and constitute a more reliable source of information, in that regard the documents thereby
serve the paramount truth-seeking function of the Court.”); Lahr, 1996 WL 34393321, at *4
(declining to suppress use of improperly taken documents in light of pursuing the truth and
considering all relevant evidence).
250. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
251. See generally JDS Uniphase Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 697.
252. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
254. Perlman, supra note 75, at 811 (discussing how consumer protection and morality are
the two factors that favor mandatory notification for inadvertent disclosures, but that because
zealous advocacy, legal analogies, and justice weigh against a legal obligation to notify,
notification should be discretionary).
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III. REVISING THE ABA MODEL RULE
As demonstrated, intentionally sent documents that are disclosed by an
anonymous third party pose an ethical quandary for lawyers.255 With no
clear guidance from courts, the ABA, or the majority of states, lawyers are
left to guess what their ethical obligations are if they receive intentionally
sent documents from an anonymous third party.256 All of the authorities
addressed above seek to provide opportunities for efficient and inexpensive
exchanges of information, while also drawing lines for how, when, and what
information can properly be obtained.257 The varying standards adopted
between the court systems create uncertainty for lawyers who find
themselves in this situation,258 and creating a clearer standard would result
in lawyers being less likely to attempt to push ethical boundaries.259
This part proposes that the ABA revise Model Rule 4.4(b) to provide the
clearest guidance for and most efficient solution to the problem of intentional
disclosures by anonymous third parties. A clear revised rule would minimize
sanctions imposed on lawyers who previously had to navigate a vague rule
and courts’ contradictory opinions. Lawyers would be able to structure their
behavior accordingly to avoid sanctions. Clear and detailed rules that leave
less discretion to the court system would minimize lawyers’ needs to seek
the opinion of ethics professionals to deal with a situation or to expend time
and energy to determine how to handle the documents correctly.260 The goal
of the ABA Model Rules is not to cause more confusion but to provide
guidance to the legal profession.261 Currently, Rule 4.4(b) does not serve
that goal and needs to be revised.
This section presents numerous solutions to the problem discussed in Part
II. Part III.A discusses why several of the justifications for not mandating
notice for anonymous disclosures fall short of sufficiently addressing the
issue. Part III.B explains why the ABA should amend Model Rule 4.4(b)
based on its position as the leading authority on legal ethics. This section
also proposes a revision for the ABA to consider. Lastly, Part III.C explains
why, should the ABA decline to amend the Model Rule, courts should
exercise their discretion to implement a notice requirement for anonymous
disclosures.
A. Extend the Notice Requirement to Anonymous Disclosures
Notice should be required for anonymous disclosures in order to provide
clear guidelines for lawyers dealing with these types of disclosures. Part
III.A.1 discusses why unauthorized and inadvertent disclosures are
sufficiently similar and should be treated the same. Part III.A.2 explains why
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See Becker, supra note 28, at 883; see also supra Parts I.B, II.
See supra Part II.
See Lucas, supra note 48, at 289.
See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
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the issue of notice and unauthorized disclosures should be addressed by
ethics rules rather than left to other law. Lastly, Part III.A.3 discusses the
conflicting interests involved and explains why judicial integrity should
outweigh the interest of a zealous advocate.
1. Inadvertent and Unauthorized Disclosures Are Sufficiently Similar
First, there is a strong argument for why inadvertent and unauthorized
disclosures are sufficiently similar to justify uniform treatment.262 The
lawyer often has no idea how documents were obtained before receiving
them, and therefore, streamlining the process to cover both inadvertent and
intentionally disclosed documents is logical. The courts in Burt Hill and
Raymond noted that documents that are obtained in a questionable manner
and disclosed without authorization probably deserve an even higher level of
ethical obligation than those sent inadvertently.263 With this consideration
in mind, implementing the same notice requirement for both types of
disclosures is the bare minimum required to protect the information and the
interests of the parties involved. Furthermore, it seems nonsensical to apply
a notice requirement to documents that are mistakenly sent to the lawyer,
while allowing the lawyer to utilize documents that are, for example,
anonymously delivered to the lawyer’s office.264 This is a distinction without
a difference. Furthermore, it has been argued that one party should not
benefit from a mere clerical error resulting in inadvertent disclosures.265
Accordingly, then, it seems clear that one party should also not benefit from
a third party’s improper acts that result in intentional disclosures. Therefore,
the notice requirement that is mandated for inadvertent disclosures should
also be extended to include anonymous disclosures.
2. Anonymous Disclosures Should Not Be Left to Other Law
The argument that the governance of unauthorized disclosures should be
left to other law is unavailing.266 Even in light of FRCP Rule 26267 and FRE
502,268 there are still major gaps concerning documents that are disclosed
intentionally, as all of these laws only discuss inadvertent disclosure.269
Professor Perlman discusses how bar associations have consistently
concluded that this topic indicates ethical concerns, so the idea that these
open questions “are now somehow more appropriately dealt with outside of
the realm of legal ethics is a dubious departure from past practice.”270
262. Fischer, supra note 20, at 231–32; see supra Part II.A.1.
263. Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485,
at *14 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL
419433, at *4–5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010); see supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text.
265. See Jones, supra note 133, at 1322.
266. See supra notes 234–42 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text.
270. See Perlman, supra note 75, at 782.
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Furthermore, none of the other law discussed makes a single mention of
documents that are disclosed without authorization.271 Additionally, leaving
it to other law becomes more complicated when dealing with lawyers who
practice in multiple jurisdictions and would need to be aware of and
understand nuances in each jurisdiction’s rules and contract laws.272 This
gap in other law addressing intentional disclosures is evident because none
of the above cases mention any other law as being highly relevant to the
decision.273 The argument that unauthorized disclosures should be left to
other law falls short of providing an efficient solution for how lawyers should
deal with these types of documents.
3. The Need for Judicial Integrity Should Outweigh Zealous Advocacy
Notifying the opposing party of what was received is not a difficult task,
and it can be accomplished in minutes. Notification allows the sending
attorney to take protective measures for the document, communicate
instructions on how to proceed with the documents or go to the court to
ensure other steps are taken.274 While receiving lawyers would benefit from
the opportunity to use documents to their client’s advantage, the judicial
system must uphold its integrity and should require its lawyers to do the
same. The competing interests issue arises again,275 but here, the lawyer’s
obligation to the judicial system should outweigh the other interests. The
Raymond and Chamberlain courts emphasized that allowing lawyers to
receive and use these documents without notifying the other side seems to
encourage extrajudicial discovery and should raise “red flags” for the
lawyers.276 Extrajudicial discovery can encourage backdoor dealings and
skullduggery and could create a slippery slope of decreasing ethical standards
if a lawyer does not proceed through formal methods. While the lawyer’s
ultimate goal is to help the client, the lawyer must also uphold the integrity
of the profession; allowing lawyers to utilize documents or information that
was disclosed without authorization just because there is essentially a
“loophole” does not serve the legal system well.277

271. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. Lucas proposed to add the following
text to the end of Rule 4.4(b): “The receiving lawyer shall use inadvertently disclosed
documents or information unless prohibited by rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, or
private agreement.” Lucas, supra note 48, at 265. This proposal would still cause confusion
even when just dealing with inadvertent disclosures. Id. In his article, he claims that
unauthorized disclosures and inadvertent disclosures can be equated with one another, yet he
proposes a solution that would only include “inadvertent disclosure.” Id.
272. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law, 69
U. CIN. L. REV. 1161, 1163–64 (2001).
273. See supra Part II.
274. Pierson, supra note 100, at 1104–05.
275. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
276. See Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485,
at *11 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); see also Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D.
392, 398 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
277. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
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Freedman’s argument that, without a rule directly on point, a lawyer
should be left to pursue whatever means is in the best interest of the client is
unreasonable.278 Lawyers must take various considerations into account—
such as the integrity of the lawyer, the profession, and the court system—
when they determine their applicable ethical duties.279 Any set of ethical
rules is inherently limited, and there is simply no practical way for a set of
rules to cover every situation in which lawyers may find themselves.280
Instead of aiming to cover all these situations, the legal profession expects a
lawyer to act reasonably, even if not specifically prescribed by a rule. This
might not always mean acting in the best interest of the client because a
lawyer’s duty is not just to the client.281 Therefore, the interest of avoiding
unethical extrajudicial discovery should outweigh the interest of the lawyer
to zealously act without ethical bounds for the interests of the client. Thus,
notice should be mandated.
All of these concerns appear even more relevant when dealing with
disclosures from anonymous third parties, as the case law in Part II
discussed.282 That the third party is maintaining anonymity at all implies a
greater chance that something awry is occurring.283 Additionally, when
documents are anonymously disclosed, the lawyer does not have a chance to
question the third party to discuss how the third party obtained the documents
or garner any specific details. Thus, the need for judicial integrity in these
situations, as supported by the courts in Merits and Raymond,284 should
outweigh any conflicting interests.
B. The ABA Should Revise Model Rule 4.4(b) to Include Anonymous
Disclosures
The ABA should adopt a clearer standard to handle situations in which
documents are intentionally disclosed without authorization by an
anonymous third party. It should do so by expanding Model Rule 4.4(b) to
cover unauthorized disclosures of this type, thus implementing a notice
requirement for both inadvertent and anonymous disclosures.285 Part III.B.1
discusses why the ABA is in the best position to provide ethical guidance to
the legal profession. Part III.B.2 highlights why there is a need for clearer
guidance for lawyers in this realm. Part III.B.3 describes the proposed
amendment to Model Rule 4.4(b).

278.
text.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 221, at 84; see supra notes 221–33 and accompanying
See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text.
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1. The ABA Is in the Best Position to Provide Guidance on Ethics
The ABA is in the best position to create clear guidelines to address
intentional, anonymous disclosures of unsolicited privileged or confidential
documents.286 The ABA’s role in developing these professional conduct
rules is to decide, if there are conflicting interests,287 which interests should
prevail.288 Looking at the ABA’s history in addressing this issue,289 the
previous Formal Opinion 94-382 did address unauthorized disclosures and
seemed to indicate that ethics rules were the best way to address this issue.290
After adopting Model Rule 4.4(b) and rescinding that formal opinion, the
ABA failed to explain why intentionally disclosed documents are not
included under Model Rule 4.4(b).291 Confusingly, now the ABA seems to
indicate that these disclosures are better handled by sources of authority
outside the realm of legal ethics.292 As one of the highest national ethics
authorities the legal world has, the ABA should not continue to waffle on the
matter. Courts, states, and individual lawyers all look to the ABA for
guidance.293 It is the ABA’s responsibility to provide clear instruction rather
than leaving the determination to other law that does not adequately address
the issue.294 The other relevant law is not always applicable,295 and
ultimately, the issue of unauthorized disclosure and the requirement of notice
to the opposing party are sufficiently ethics-related and deserve proper
guidance. Furthermore, a uniform model rule, which has been shown to
influence many states to adopt an identical or similar version,296 could reduce
forum shopping in cases in which a conflict of law analysis would apply.297
People expect lawyers to act as advocates, not angels, and thus a revised
Model Rule would serve to temper their zeal.
2. The Legal Profession Needs Clear Guidance About Anonymous
Disclosures
When it is difficult for lawyers to ascertain what their ethical obligations
are, they are likely to fall short of fulfilling the bar’s expectations—even if

286. See Kendrick, supra note 19, at 776.
287. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
288. See Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to
Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 245–46 (2010) (discussing how the
Model Rules require or permit an attorney to put the interests of an opponent, a court, or a
third party ahead of the lawyer’s own client).
289. See supra Part I.B.
290. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text; see also Perlman, supra note 75, at
782.
291. See supra Part I.B.2.
292. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part II.C.2.
295. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
297. See Gloria A. Kristopek, To Peek or Not to Peek: Inadvertent or Unsolicited
Disclosure of Documents to Opposing Counsel, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 643, 680 (1999).
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the failure is not done in bad faith.298 For example, in Burt Hill, the lawyer
believed that he was fulfilling his ethical duties by following the black letter
law that was relevant in the forum state.299 However, because the court chose
to expand the scope of Rule 4.4(b), the court sanctioned the lawyer to remedy
his ethical violation.300 Professional conduct rules should “say what they
mean and mean what they say.”301 Since the ABA presumably wants lawyers
in each jurisdiction to comply with the rules, it would be logical for the ABA
to create clear rules that leave little room for interpretation.302
By amending Rule 4.4(b) to include anonymously disclosed documents,
lawyers would be left with fewer questions, and courts would not have to
make discretionary judgments on a case-by-case basis.303 Leaving this
determination to case law has clearly led to inconsistencies and is not a
sustainable solution to an increasingly relevant problem. 304 Furthermore,
state courts should adopt these standards in order for the revised rule to have
the force of law and to provide consistent ethical obligations across state
borders, which would allow the rules to be integrated into federal courts.
3. Proposed Amendment to Model Rule 4.4(b)
Amending Model Rule 4.4(b) by extending it to include intentional
disclosures by an anonymous third party would help alleviate the concerns
discussed in Part II.305 Model Rule 4.4(b) should be revised to read:
(b) A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information
relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably
should know that the document or electronically stored information was
inadvertently sent, or was disclosed by an anonymous third party, shall
promptly notify the sender.306

In practice, this would resolve all the cases discussed in Part II. All
documents that are anonymously disclosed would automatically confer a
298. See Schaefer, supra note 288, at 241.
299. Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan.
29, 2010).
300. Id. at *9–10.
301. See Schaefer, supra note 288, at 242.
302. Id.
303. See Kendrick, supra note 19, at 776 (proposing that the ABA “broaden [Model Rule
4.4(b)’s] scope and make it applicable in circumstances where privileged or confidential
documents are intentionally disclosed”); see also supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part II. Compare Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 161282, 2017 WL 2831485, at *14 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (requiring notice for an anonymous
delivery of helpful documents), and Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *9 (same), with
Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 506, 515–16 (W.D. Wis. 2011) (declining to
require notice under similar facts).
305. As previously mentioned, many of the arguments discussed in Part II could apply to
unauthorized disclosures more generally. However, this Note proposes that this notice
requirement only applies to the facet of case law dealing with the anonymous disclosures
discussed in Part II.
306. The addition is shown in italicized text. This Note acknowledges that this may cause
problems with, for example, criminal cases. However, since the ABA does not carve out an
exception for criminal cases or SEC lawyers, for example, the edited rule similarly does not.
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notice requirement on the receiving attorney, serving the interest of
maintaining judicial integrity and encouraging lawyers to go through ethical
discovery processes.307 Instead of questioning how anonymous disclosures
fit within other law,308 a clear model rule that is adopted by the states309
would better serve the legal community.310
C. Courts Should Exercise Their Discretion and Mandate Notice with
Anonymous Disclosures
If the ABA fails to make a new rule, courts should act based on their
interest in maintaining judicial integrity, by expanding the notice requirement
to anonymous disclosures.311 The inconsistency with which courts have
handled documents that are disclosed from an anonymous third party makes
it extremely difficult for lawyers to understand their ethical obligations,
especially for those who practice in multiple state and federal courts.312 The
courts, as the ultimate ethical authority, have the discretion to impose ethical
duties as they see fit.313 Therefore, courts have the ability to implement a
notice obligation for anonymous disclosures.314 While guidance by the ABA
is preferred,315 the courts hold the authority to create a similar solution
through their decisions.316
When adopting such a solution, if there is no modification to the current
ABA Model Rules and the jurisdiction has a Rule 4.4(b) that is identical or
substantially similar to Model Rule 4.4(b), courts in that jurisdiction should
follow the guidance from the courts that chose to expand Rule 4.4(b) and
implement the notice requirement for documents that are disclosed from an
anonymous third party.317 Courts should consider that the ethical rules are
simply a starting point for determining a lawyer’s ethical duties and that the
lawyer must look beyond them to determine their obligations.318 Therefore,
any res judicata issues aside, the courts should use their discretion to
307. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
308. See supra Part I.C.
309. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
310. This is very similar to the approach taken in the Merits case, which implemented a
notice requirement for anonymously provided documents. See Merits Incentives, L.L.C. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of State, ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 262 P.3d 720, 725 (Nev. 2011).
311. See supra Part III.A.
312. See Ribstein, supra note 272, at 1163–64 (explaining that law firms with offices in
different states are subject to a variety of ethical restrictions, often resulting in the firm’s
adherence to the most restrictive standards in a manner that may be inefficient and ineffective
for serving the firms’ clients in a particular jurisdiction); see also supra Part II.
313. See supra Part I.C.1.
314. See generally Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017); Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A 09-1285, 2010 WL
419433 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010). See also Merits, 262 P.3d at 720.
315. See supra Part III.B.1.
316. An individual court’s adoption of a notice requirement would be binding only in that
court’s specific jurisdiction. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. This is partially
why a revised model rule is preferred: because of its likelihood that the impact would be more
widespread than a court decision, which would impact only that jurisdiction. Id.
317. See supra Part II.A.
318. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
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analogize documents disclosed from an anonymous third party to
inadvertently disclosed documents and thus expand the notice requirement
from Model Rule 4.4(b) to include both.319
CONCLUSION
In a world where accessing important information is increasingly easier,
there is a prevalent need for a clear rule defining a lawyer’s obligations in
questionable situations. The ABA has continued to switch its position on a
lawyer’s obligations upon the lawyer’s receipt of documents that are
disclosed anonymously, and this has left lawyers speculating endlessly about
their ethical obligations. Model Rule 4.4(b) implements a notice requirement
for inadvertent disclosures, explicitly leaving intentional disclosures to other
law. However, situations involving anonymous disclosures have resulted in
numerous inconsistencies in different courts and jurisdictions. It is unfair for
lawyers to face ethical sanctions through no bad faith or fault of their own
but rather because the ethical duties surrounding these documents are
unclear. Therefore, this Note proposes a revision to Model Rule 4.4(b) to
include anonymous disclosures and encourages state courts to implement this
revision to clarify the ethical obligations around these types of documents.

319. See supra Part III.A.

